Last Updated: November 2018
OzCHI 2018 Work-In-Progress Paper
My team's first foray into the world of usable security will appear at
OzCHI 2018, Australia's leading
Human Computer Interaction (HCI) research venue. As part of our ongoing
work around the Cross Domain Desktop Compositor
[Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC) 2016 ], we
carried out a small user study to investigate the validity of one of
the basic assumptions that underpins such systems: that users will behave
securely, once sufficiently trained and motivated to protect sensitive
information. Our initial results (our aggregate, anonymous data are available online) were encouraging, and highlight the need
for this kind of empirical usable security evaluation to complement
more traditional means of assurance. However we have barely scratched the
surface and there remains much more work to be done in this area.
Credit and thanks goes to my student
Abdullah Issa, who performed this research as part of his Masters of Computer Science
SecDev 2018 Best Paper Award
Congratulations Dr Daniel Matichuk!
Congratulations to Daniel Matichuk, whose PhD thesis Automation for Proof Engineering:
Machine-Checked Proofs At Scale recently passed examination
Daniel's thesis explores the use of automation for tackling the scalability
challenges in large-scale proof engineering efforts, in the context of
the Isabelle proof assistant. I'm honoured to
have co-supervised Daniel's PhD alongside Gerwin Klein at Data61 and UNSW.
OpenGov Recognition of Excellence Award for the CDDC
I am a Senior Lecturer in the School of Computing and Information Systems of the University of Melbourne. Prior to joining Melbourne in May 2016,
I was employed in the Software Systems
Research Group of NICTA (now Data61), and was a Conjoint Senior Lecturer in the school of
Computer Science and Engineering of
UNSW. I joined NICTA and UNSW in 2010 from
Oxford, where I completed a D.Phil. (PhD) in Computer Science, awarded in 2011.
Before moving to Oxford, I worked for the
Defence Science and Technology Organisation after my undergraduate study
at the University of Adelaide.
I live in Melbourne with my wife and two children, enjoy (and sometimes write and
record) alternative music,
and spend too much time on Twitter
engaging a hot-cold obsession with Australian politics, security and privacy.
I love great ales, informed by my days in Oxford, and rich reds, like any Adelaide
Research and Collaborations
My research is focused on the problem of how to build highly secure computing
systems cost-effectively. As part of this,
I lead Data61's work on proving computer software and
systems secure, and am leading or otherwise involved in a number of projects as part of
Data61's Trustworthy Systems
activity, as detailed on my Data61 page. Below are listed my current active areas of research and collaboration.
My interest in security, and belief about the best ways to build secure systems
more effectively, is very broad. Thus
I tend to collaborate across various
disciplines including Software Engineering, Systems, Hardware Security,
Programming Languages and Human Factors.
Information Flow One of the biggest challenges faced in security today
is how to ensure that computer systems can keep their secrets from well-motivated
adversaries — just think of how many news stories you've read about personal
information having been stolen and publicised by attackers. For this reason,
a large part of my research has investigated how to guarantee the absence of unwanted
information leaks in computer software and systems. I led the team that completed
the world's first proof [IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy ("Oakland" S&P) 2013 ]
of information flow security for a general-purpose operating
system kernel, seL4, which you can read more about on the
project page. This proof, along with subsequent work, guarantees that seL4 will
prevent all unwanted information leaks up to timing channels, i.e. that it is
free of unwanted storage channels.
My current work in this space aims to understand how to verify information
flow security for concurrent programs (like those that run on top of seL4),
and how to compile such programs while making sure they still preserve their
security guarantees. This work is being carried out under the banner of the
open-source COVERN project [IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) 2018 ], which builds on
our earlier work for exploring these questions [IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) 2016 ].
Alongisde this work, I've also been exploring how to build program logics for proving information flow
security of low-level C code. A recent short paper [Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security (PLAS) 2017 ] describes the main ideas, developed in
collaboration with Samuel Gruetter (MIT).
Timing Channels Timing channels
leak information (whether intentionally or not) to an adversary who can
observe differences in the relative timing of different events.
Unlike for storage channels, we are not yet
able to prove the absence of timing channels in systems, largely because many
timing channels exploit the timing properties of hardware microarchitectural
features, like caches, which are not even documented, so are very difficult
to reason about formally. For this reason, these channels must be dealt with empirically.
I have been involved in NICTA's Timing and Side Channels activity, where we pioneered new techniques for
empirically measuring the effectiveness of various timing channel mitigation
techniques for seL4 [ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) 2014 ].
Cost-Effective Verified Systems via Verifying DSLs While security proofs, like
for seL4 that I have led, can give extremely high levels of assurance for
security-critical systems, they remain relatively expensive to perform. Much of
my recent research has therefore focused on how to reduce the cost of verifying
properties of systems software. One technique I have explored, in collaboration with
Programming Languages researchers from UNSW (notably Gabi Keller) via NICTA's
Cogent project, has been to write verified systems software in a Domain
Specific Language (DSL). Cogent [International Conference on Functional Programming (ICFP) 2016 ] is a programming language that is carefully designed to enable systems written in it to be
cheaply proved correct. It is coupled with a verifying compiler [International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP) 2016 ] that automatically
proves that the compiled code implements the Cogent source semantics.
In conjunction with my PhD students Sidney Amani and Liam O'Connor
(co-supervised with Gabi Keller), my undergraduate thesis student
Japheth Lim, and the rest of the Cogent team,
we have used this technique to
build and (partially) formally verify correct Linux file systems far more cheaply
than e.g. the verification for the seL4 kernel [International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems (ASPLOS) 2016 ].
Proof Cost Estimation The effort required to verify software
as being secure is an obvious barrier to its wide adoption. But just as
important is the inability of software engineering managers to be able to
predict the costs (and associated benefits) of proving their software
correct. Another of my recent research activities has been to investigate this
question in the context of NICTA's Proof, Measurement and Estimation (PME) project. As part of this work,
my PhD student Daniel Matichuk and I, in collaboration with Empirical Software Engineering researchers
and NICTA's PME team, explored the relationship between the size of a statement to
be proved about a piece of software, and the amount of effort required to prove
the statement (using as a proxy the number of lines required to write the proof,
which we had already established [ACM/IEEE Symposium on Empirical Software Engineering and Measurement (ESEM) 2014 ]
is strongly linearly related).
To do so, we crunched historical data
about the various seL4 proofs as well
as some other large, publicly available software proofs. We
established empirically for the first time [International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE) 2015 ] that a consistent relationship exists here
and that it is in fact quadratic. This work is the first step towards building
a predictive model for estimating the level of effort required to verify a piece of
Proof Automation Besides writing verified software in custom DSLs
leveraging verifying compilation to dramatically ease the cost of formally verifying
secure systems, another more direct approach I have investigated with my PhD
student Daniel Matichuk has been to develop languages in which custom, automatic proof tactics can be written for the Isabelle proof assistant. Daniel designed and developed Eisbach [International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP) 2014 , Journal of Automated Reasoning (to appear)] the first such language that integrates with Isabelle's high-level
notation for writing (structured) proofs, and so requires no knowledge of Isabelle's
internals, making it usable by relative novices.
Highly-Secure and Usable, Verified Cross Domain Systems All of
the above research is aimed towards being able to build extremely secure
systems — and to demonstrate via rigorous evidence that they are indeed
so — at reasonable cost. I am currently leading, alongside Kevin Elphinstone, a collaboration with the
Defence Science and Technology Group (DST Group), in which we are building and formally verifying as secure a
device called the Cross Domain Desktop Compositor (CDDC)
[Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC) 2016 ].
The CDDC allows users to interact with both highly-classified and lower-classification networks from a single display (monitor), keyboard and mouse.
Its design makes it far more secure than existing solutions
while also offering much greater usability, showing that with clever design
usability and security need not be in conflict. We are currently working on
building and verifying an seL4-based implementation of the device,
leveraging our current work on verified
information flow security.
Usable Security As part of my work on building and verifying
cross domain systems, I am
also investigating how issues of usability and security, including human cognition
and perception, interact with the process of formally proving a system secure.
This work is still in its very early stages
[Australian Computer Human Interaction Conference
(OzCHI) 2018 ], and there
remains much more to be done.
Reasoning about Capability-Based Software
Continuing the work I began during my D.Phil. (PhD), where I investigated
[thesis ] techniques
to formally reason about the security of capability-based security-enforcing software abstractions,
I am currently collaborating with
researchers from Imperial College London, Victoria University Wellington and Google on techniques for formally reasoning about risk and trust (including the absence of such) for capability-based
Working with Me
I'm always looking for motivated students to work with. Check out my page for
prospective research students
has a fairly complete list of my publications. You can also try my entry on
, which may not
be quite so complete.
In 2018, I am currently teaching:
I have previously taught:
- SWEN90006 - Software Testing and Reliability (2016, 2017)
- SWEN90010 - High Integrity Systems Engineering (2017)
And before that, at UNSW:
- COMP4161 - Advanced Topics in Software Verification (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 as Lecturer in Charge, 2015)
- COMP9241 - Advanced Operating Systems (Guest lecturer in Operating Systems Security, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015)
I have also taught half-day courses to industry on topics including:
- Separation Logic
- Software Model Checking for C code using
If your company develops
software and would like to know how you can more easily detect and remove bugs
during development, and would like to know more, please get in touch.