

# **Redefining the Information System Security Policy**

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## **Abstract**

While information security policy development seems to have some foundation in the literature, it is uncertain whether the methods described are operationalized in an organizational setting. Little is known about how organizations develop security policies, how these policies are documented, what factors contribute to policy effectiveness and how policy effectiveness is determined. In addition, for most organizations, securing their information is not considered a core business objective. This paper identifies potential problems in current security policy development practice, and offers suggestions about how these problems may be addressed.

## **Introduction**

As more frequent security incidents are experienced, the need for organizations to become more involved with securing and actively protecting their information from malicious and non-malicious acts is apparent (Jung, Han and Lee 2001; Liebmann 2001). Consequently, the importance of having a well-defined strategic security policy document should be becoming evident to many organizations. A strategic security policy is “the set of laws, rules and practices that regulate how an organization manages, protects and distributes resources to achieve specified security policy objectives. These laws, rules and practices must identify criteria for according individuals authority, and may specify conditions under which individuals are permitted to exercise their authority.” (Olson and Abrams 1995) The process of developing a strategic security policy forces a company to identify risks to their information and to plan for the possibility that its information system is a viable point of attack, either from internal or external sources. Failure to do this adequately can lead to a number of problems for some organizations. For example, there are a number of anecdotes showing that employees who behave inappropriately cannot be dismissed, as no security policy existed stating their behaviour was inappropriate, even though it was damaging to the organization (Leinfuss 1996; Robinson 1997).

The risks to organizational information are often underrated by organizations that do not realise the importance of protecting their information; they underestimate how costly, financially or to image, it would be if it fell into competitors’ hands, or was misused. It is an unfortunate fact that securing an organization’s information is not considered a core business objective by most organizations. As a result, some organizations are unwilling to make the hard decisions required to protect their information. Fortunately this is changing.

The interest and awareness of organizations with regard to securing their information assets has increased steadily over the last decade (James and Coldwell 1993; Ernst and Young 1995; Davis 1996; Kearvell-White 1996; Ernst and Young 1997). In particular, the development of organizational security policies has become more important to organizations. An Ernst and Young (1998) survey found that 56% of organizations had security policies in place. Unfortunately, many of these policies are not audited or maintained and only 64% of those organizations having a policy monitored compliance with the policy (Ernst and Young 1998). It is clear that the uptake of policy development is on the increase within organizations, but policy maintenance and policy compliance in some organizations, remain problem issues.

This paper identifies a number of organizational issues that need to be addressed to improve information security. The findings of this research should be beneficial to any organization that has, or is planning to implement an information systems security policy. Any improvement to an organization's security policies will result in a tangible improvement in the security of information and systems and may, in turn, improve customer and employee confidence about the safety of organizational information. The addition of practical knowledge to the theoretical background and research will improve research and commercial practice in information system security policy development.

### **What is a Strategic Information Security Policy**

There are several definitions of information systems security policy. Olson and Abrams' (1995) definition used before is "the set of laws, rules and practices that regulate how an organization manages, protects and distributes resources to achieve specified security policy objectives. These laws, rules and practices must identify criteria for according individuals authority, and may specify conditions under which individuals are permitted to exercise their authority." This definition is similar to those given by other researchers (Kokalakis and Kiountouzis 2000, Henderson 1996, Robinson 1997). A security policy is thus attempting to protect an asset, either physical or information based, from malicious or accidental damage. By establishing a recovery plan within a policy, the organization is prepared for the worst possible situation.

What many of these definitions fail to do is to differentiate between the different types of security policy within an organization. The term "security policy" means different things to different people. Some employees would define it as the "Acceptable Use Policy", or the "Internet and Mail Policy", others would define it as the "Information Security Statement" or the "Information Security Policy". There are vast differences between these types of policies. The "Acceptable Use" type policies, known as task, process or system specific policies contain system or task specific details, whereas the organizational type policies contain the strategic policy statements for the organization.

Often an organization will develop a hierarchy of policy documents to deal with "security policy". The hierarchy may have documents like an "Information Security Policy" or "Information Policy" at the top and will have documents like "Email Usage" or "Internet Use Policy" at the lower levels of the hierarchy. The strategic policy statements in such a case will be within the top one or two levels of the hierarchy. Figure 1 shows a hierarchy of security policy which is typical of the policy structure within a large organization.




Figure 1 : A typical set of security policy documents

This research deals exclusively with those policies designed at a strategic level to protect the organizations information assets.

### Problems in Security Policy Development

There are several areas of concern for organizations to address as they carry out the development of an information security policy. In the following sections, the 8 issues shown below will be discussed.

1. The lack of guidance as to how to develop a security policy
2. No link between risks and policy statements
3. Making strategic security policy a core business objective
4. Support of the influence of the policy lifecycle on the policy development
5. Enforcement of security policies
6. Insufficient documentation of security policy development
7. The cost of policy development
8. Security Policy Awareness

#### *The lack of guidance as to how to develop a security policy*

There are many methods discussed in the literature about how to write a security policy. These methods can be split into two major groups. The first group uses a set of pre-written authoritative policy statements that are used to produce a workable policy. There are several companies specialising in selling these types of tools to organizations (Pentafast Security Technologies<sup>1</sup> 2001, Solsource 1998). The writing of the policy involves determining the area of risk within the organization and then selecting from a number of pre-written statements about that particular area. This is done in a similar manner to piecing together a jigsaw. Often a sample policy is shown to give some sort of idea what a completed policy should look like. This method is a fairly inexpensive way an organization can go about producing a policy. All they need to do is to purchase a document outlining the policy statements with directions on how to use them. Alternatively a company representative can be hired to tailor the policy statements for the organization, producing a tailored security

<sup>1</sup> Formally the company was called Baseline Software

policy. These types of policy efforts are directed to what we would call “Operational Security Policies”, and would be used for the development of those policies in the bottom half of Figure 1.

The second group defines process-oriented methods of security policy development that could be used to generate strategic or operational type policies. This method involves the development, implementation and on going maintenance of the security policy within the organization. The security policy produced is tailored specifically for the organization and will probably be useless to any other organization. These methods are distinguished by their orientation around the process of policy development, which never really finishes at it has an iterative nature. There are several versions of a process of security policy development (Bayuk 1996 Control Data 1999, Woodward 2000, DTI 1999, Computer Technology Research Group 1998, State of Oregon 1998). An example of such a process is shown in Figure 2. Essentially the process goes from the identification of what to secure, through a series of prototype documents, to producing a draft policy. Then the policy is approved and published; from this point the process repeats itself as the policy is continuously updated.




Figure 2. A Process of Policy Development Bayuk (1996)

From these two approaches it is apparent that each describes the contents of the security policy, but in general fail to describe the process to generate the output of these sections. It is a standard practice to describe what should be in the policy, but not to back it up with any obvious industry case studies, or examples (Leinfuss 1996; McMillan 1998; Computer Technology Research Corporation 1998; State Of Oregon 1998). This focus means that there is no clear link with what is written in research and what is done in industry. Also whilst there is evidence of reusing policy statements in the first approach, in the second approach there does not seem to be any attempt to reuse any part of the developed policy in policy updates.

***No links between risks and policy statements***

In some organizations, depending on the development method chosen, the policy statements developed may not be directly attributed to the risks to the information they are designed to

nullify. It is important to be able to have a verifiable link between the risks to information and to the policies aimed to reduce these risks. Unfortunately, with the development methods discussed above there is no link evident. The key to this problem may lie in better documenting the process of information security policy development (this is discussed further in a subsequent section).

### *Making strategic security policy a core business objective*

As information and information processing capabilities of organizations are generally critical for the functioning of the organization, it is important that these be protected through physical measures and via organizational policies. Organizations need to realise the consequences if suddenly their information was not available, was corrupted in some manner, or was handed to their competitors. Swanson and Guttman (1996) therefore suggest that these resources should be protected like other important organizational assets: by having adequate policies and procedures. Unfortunately, as many organizations do not recognise the value of their information, security of that information tends not to be regarded as critical to the business. Woodward (2000) suggests that organizations must determine how important their information assets are to the functioning of the organization so that they are able to make this link.

The greatest obstacle for organizations in addressing security concerns is the lack of support given from senior management (Ernst and Young 1998)<sup>2</sup>. As security does not form part of the core business objectives, some organizations rather put resources into what they think are more profitable areas. Furthermore, in some organizations where state of the art security exists it is not used effectively, or is not supported with effective procedures and policies. "By itself installation of hardware and software for security can not protect an organization's assets" (Henderson 1996). Having these physical aspects of security covered does not mean that employees, or outsiders, will not knowingly or unknowingly compromise these security efforts. Others agree that any physical security measures implemented will be less effective without policies and procedures designed to protect the organization's information assets (Swanson and Guttman 1996, Guttman and Bagwill 1999, Bayuk 1996, Control Data 1999). Adequate security is having quality security policies being defined by appropriate people in an organization that go hand in hand with technologies to protect the organization's information assets. An analogy here can be drawn between the security policy and insurance policies that organizations purchase. The security policy is an attempt to provide insurance for the organization's information.

This begs the question as to who should develop security policy. This seems to best be answered by stating that no single individual should develop the policy (State of Oregon 1998, Henderson 1996). Having multiple stakeholders involved in the policy development tends to reduce the impact of implementation of the policy and allows for multiple perspectives to be met within the policy. It is also argued that those people developing policy statements should be senior in the organization, and should come from every functional area. Further, it is argued that it is extremely important to have the commitment of all senior executives throughout the organization as the policy may change the way in which things are done within the organization, it must be seen as being a directive from above (State of Oregon 1998). Without this, it is possible that employees will think the policy is unimportant and will continue as before, possibly continuing to infringe some of the policy principles.

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<sup>2</sup> 19% of organizations also stated that management support was the greatest obstacle to addressing security concerns (ibid.)

Unfortunately, obtaining senior level commitment does not seem to be occurring in organizations. Warman (1995) states that security policy formation is only being carried out at a low level in organizations, that the requirements of end users are taken into account, but their involvement in the development of the policy is discouraged, and the amount of executive level involvement in the development is minor. This is directly opposite to the views of normative writers on the subject (who state that there should be high management involvement in policy development), which may either suggest that the theory is incorrect or that organizations are ignoring the theory. Warman (1995) observes, “It is interesting therefore to note the contrast between the ideas and theory of security policy that appear to be recognised and accepted, and the actual practice of their implementation within organizations [which does not follow the theory]”. Furthermore, it is unlikely that senior staff will want to participate in a security policy development if it is not considered core to the business.

### ***Support of the influence of the policy lifecycle on the policy development***

The influence of the policy lifecycle on policy development deals with when and how the policy is updated and whether it is being enforced. In essence this is a policy audit that tests whether people are complying with the policy, and if the policy needs to be modified to incorporate changes to the information risks faced by the organization.

Some organizations who have a security policy fail to revisit that policy periodically to determine if it is still effective. Several of the development methods discussed previously briefly describe the development of the policy as a process that goes through continual re-development, yet neglect to specify how it is determined what needs to be updated, added or removed from the policy. Consequently, there is little information about how to determine if the information security policy is effective in achieving the aims of development determined by the organization. This may also be caused by the policy having no link between risk and policy statements.

This issue is further clouded by organizations out-sourcing security policy development. Presently there are numerous companies that sell their services as security policy development professionals, or who provide a number of templates to companies on which they can base their policy (for example Solsource 1998). Many companies are blindly using this service without thinking about the consequences. They have no organizational memory dealing with the development of the security policy; rather, they have the end artefact – the policy itself. This does not only occur in the case of out-sourced policy development. Loss of organizational memory regarding security policy can also occur for internally developed policies. Employees may leave the company and the expertise they have developed in creating the security policy is lost to that company if it is not documented.

### ***Enforcement of security policies***

Having a security policy however is not enough. The majority of companies that have clearly stated policies do not enforce them adequately (Robinson 1997). Ernst and Young (1998) report a drop from 74% (in 1997) to 64% (in 1998) in the number of organizations monitoring compliance with policy. This indicates that there may be a problem in organizations allocating resources for the compliance process, or that organizations have a problem in identifying how to monitor compliance. Once again, this may be a result of research not specifying methods of testing whether compliance with a security policy is present within the organization. It is important that a security policy not only exists but also is enforced within the organization; otherwise the organization is leaving itself open to widespread damage from

internal and external security breaches. Hence, it is important for organizations to have a strategy of ensuring that the policy is communicated to employees and is enforced.

A possible reason for this inadequacy of enforcement is that many of the security policies developed in organizations are very rich in the information they contain and that it is difficult to enforce something that is not clearly understood. McMillan (1998) suggests that security policies should contain only principles. Many policies developed currently are not principles documents. They attempt to fit everything into the security policy: the justification of importance and specific system instructions and descriptions. The practice of putting it all in the information security policy has a direct link to the manner in which these policies are developed. A useful analogy here is software development. Imagine if all of the documentation for the development of a software product was part of the code produced. This seems to be a flawed approach. An improvement to this approach could be the better use of documentation techniques within the development of the policy causing the security policy to become a principles document. Other issues not dealing with the principles of security policy could then be documented elsewhere along with the justification for the policy.

### ***Insufficient documentation of security policy development***

A major problem is the lack of documentation produced by current information security policy development methods. Maynard and Ruighaver (1999) argue that documentation of the security policy process is critical to ensure that the policy developed can be justified. Also the documentation of the how and the why of policy development may allow for future redevelopment of the policy allowing organizations to better determine the effectiveness of the policy. Each of the development methods discussed suggests what needs to be done to develop a security policy, but, as nobody mentions the need to document the development process of the policy, many organizations arrive at a security policy (that may or may not be well developed) that seems to its users as having no documented basis. This lack of adequate documentation also hampers the inevitable further development and adaptation of the security policy to a changing environment.

For example, Henderson (1996) discusses the development of security policy through the identification of why the policy is needed, who should develop it, how detailed it should be, and what it should contain. There is no concept of documenting the process, or the policy, to enable ongoing change and management of what should be an evolving document. As a result, if the person(s) who wrote the document leaves the company the document may never be maintained, enforced, or even used.

### ***The cost of policy development***

An issue rarely discussed in research is the cost of information security policy development. As with any organizational expenditure, the cost of implementing an information security policy will affect the bottom line. Through the use of a policy an organizations may save money, through the balancing of the risks (of not having a policy) and benefits (that the policy provides). For some organizations the cost of policy development would outweigh the risks and therefore that organization may decide not to implement a policy. For other organizations, though, the policy may provide leverage for the implementation of security measures and may prevent major loss of information assets.

As a result, before strategic information security policies are developed, clear benefits must be perceived by the organization. As the importance of information for an organization's core business activities increases, so does the benefits of protecting that information. At a certain

point, the benefits of insuring the information through the use of a policy will outweigh any costs incurred by the development and implementation of the policy.

The role of reuse in security policy development must also be addressed. It is often the case that much of previous security policies can be reused in updated policies. Furthermore the cost of security can be reduced through more thorough involvement of organizational personnel. For strategic based policies if middle to upper management involvement was included in development then the ownership of the policy and therefore the awareness of security and the security policy would be given to these personnel. Likewise for operational policies user level employees could be made to feel ownership and responsibility towards security. If this was done the cost of security enforcement and compliance monitoring may be reduced as the drivers behind security would be the employees, rather than IT management; essentially this is a culture building exercise.

### *Security Policy Awareness*

The major threats to information that organizations face originate from both unauthorised and authorised users. In an Ernst and Young (1997) survey malicious acts by current employees were reported by 43% of organizations. These acts all resulted in some effect on the information processing capabilities of the organizations involved. However, from these results it is unclear as to why these acts were committed. The fact that employees are causing the information assets of the organization to be affected by their actions is potentially a large problem to many organizations. If information is not safe internally then how does an organization guarantee that its information will be correct and un-adulterated? This problem could be attributed to the general lack of security awareness that is shown by many organization workers.

In the 1998 Ernst and Young survey, 34% of respondents state that employee awareness was the greatest obstacle to addressing security concerns. Traditional approaches to generating security policies tend to generate a policy and then train your personnel to obey the policy. This does not seem to be giving sufficient results within organizations. Thus, it is necessary for the organization to attempt to change cultural values to make clear that security is a key issue and to give employee's clear ownership of security. One way to do this is to have more involvement in security policy development at all levels within the organization to enable staff to see why it is important and to feel part of the process. As awareness in security grows, employees will be better able to identify breaches of security and would be more inclined to report incidents.

Awareness is also affected by organizational change. The development of an information security policy may introduce radical changes to information processes and to the culture of an organization. The marketing of the policy and education about the policy are important in order to help to manage the changes to the organization resulting from policy implementation. Employees should be made aware of why the policy is being implemented, how it will affect them and what the consequences are if they do not follow it (Leinfuss 1996, Control Data 1999).

By involving employees in this manner it is more likely that they will be committed to the policy and will actively participate. Security policy awareness needs to be taught in a tailored manner and employees must be taught the values of the assets, the risks and the costs so that they are better able to appreciate the policy and thus comply with it. Bayuk (1996) states "...policy dictates what must be done to provide an acceptable level of assurance that systems are secure. Awareness process ensures that people know what must be done. To achieve

assurance that policy is being followed uniformly throughout the organization, security management must also address how policy is to be realised.” The policy in essence should be shown as critically important to the functioning of the organization. Without careful education and marketing of the information security policy it may be regarded as just another “stupid policy”.

### **What should be done to improve the situation**

From the 8 issues discussed above it is clear why many organizations are struggling to deal with the security policy development process. Perhaps the best place for an organization to start is with the question: What are the benefits to the organization of developing and maintaining an appropriate strategic security policy? From this point it may then be beneficial to use the issues discussed above to generate the answer to this question. This section will outline a number of guidelines as to how organizations may want to proceed to attempt to address these issues. Many of these may have been touched on in the previous discussion.

#### ***The lack of guidance as to how to develop a security policy***

There are plenty of good examples of security policies generally available publicly via the internet or within organizations. However, having the policy artefact is only one of the benefits of the process of strategic security policy development. Organizations should concentrate on how the security policy is developed and use the development process as a tool, not only to develop a policy, but to identify additional benefits for the organization. The process itself should document how the policy was developed, what decisions are made, which policy statements are derived in answer to what risks.

#### ***The cost of policy development***

The benefits of using a policy development process, rather than just a policy, need to be defined for the business. Reducing costs through changing how awareness and compliance are dealt with by empowering employees in the policy development process may be a selling point. Make use of reuse. Through the documentation of the policy development process meaningful information will be generated that will allow reuse to occur when updates to the policy occur. Clear indications will be present identifying why certain decisions were made about the structure of the policy and about security in the organization. You do not need to reinvent the wheel.

#### ***Making strategic security policy a core business objective***

If the focus the policy development process is on the core business issues it is more likely to get management support. Once an initial policy is developed then look at the most important core issue and begin a constant process of enhancing the security policies. There is no need to develop a comprehensive security policy in one hit. Realise that the security policy will be in need of constant change and address that change using the core issues and develop many iterations of the policy by focusing on these issues. This focus on the core issues should attract interest of all relevant stakeholders, including management.

#### ***Security Policy Awareness***

Organizations may wish to change the attitudes of their employee’s by encouraging them to play a role in the policy development. Giving them ownership and teaching them an understanding of the importance of security within the organization is paramount. The

empowerment of employees with regard to security will result in a cultural shift that will mean that part of every employee's job will be to ensure that security is not compromised. This may in turn, reduce costs of awareness training and enforcement. In a similar vein, organizations should promote the successes of the policy, rather than focusing on the security breaches that occur. This will enable the organization to move forward, and will show the policy as a "good thing" and will further promote it awareness.

### ***Enforcement of security policies***

Organizations should use the KISS principle (Keep It Simple Stupid). Only put policy statements in the security policy if they are understandable by all employees. Keep the security policy a principles document that is uncluttered by unnecessary information. Use other documents to store other information that doesn't belong in the policy. As for Security Policy Awareness, involve any people who are likely to be influenced by the policy in the development process as this will likely help you enforce the policies in the long term. As awareness of the policy increases employee self enforcement of the policy should also increase.

### ***Support of the influence of the policy lifecycle on the policy development***

In our view security should be exclusively developed within the organization. If necessary outside consultants can be asked for advice, but the organizational knowledge about the development must be kept within the organization. Also, attempt to avoid losing organizational memory when people move on from their current positions by using the development process wisely to document decisions. This may be a knowledge management issue. Finally, do not attempt to develop the ultimate security policy in the first instance. This will take too long and may end any support the process had at an organizational level. Rather, as stated above, use strategic issues as a guide as to what to do first.

### ***Insufficient documentation of security policy development***

Many of the problems dealing with organizational memory may be relieved if organizations develop a self documenting process of security policy development. They can use this documentation to explain the reasoning behind the development of the security policy. This documentation can also be used for evaluation of the current policy and for the further documentation of resulting policies.

### ***No link between risks and policy statements***

The above documentation process can also be used to document the process used to identify the risks important to the organization. This documentation can also be used to link risks to policy statements so that a clear understanding can be made. This is especially important in those organizations that do not perform a traditional risk assessment.

### **Conclusion**

This paper identifies a range of issues about security policy development that organizations need to address. It then suggests some guidelines to direct organizations in their strategic security policy development efforts. The most important issue is that development of strategic information security policy should be part of the organizations core business objectives. This is critically important if organizations expect to adequately protect their

information resources and, until this is accomplished, it will be difficult to effectively address the enforcement of policy and employee awareness of security.

Whilst we argue that strategic information security policy should be a core business objective, we recognise that for any particular organization the extensiveness of this policy will vary. The resources an organization allocates to develop and implement a strategic information security policy will, like all organizational decisions, really depend on economical issues. The importance being placed by many organizations on Electronic Commerce is likely tip the scales towards having a more comprehensive strategic information security policy, as the likelihood of severe losses will increase dramatically.

In general terms the process of strategic information security policy development must be revisited. We suggest that there is no clear link between research and industry practice for security policy development, and that current development practices portrayed in research do not adequately document the development process. Furthermore, we argue that in most security policies the link between risks and policy statements is unclear and that before the effectiveness of an information security policy can be tested a new standard regarding the documentation of the development process, necessary for such an evaluation, will have to be developed.

### **Further research**

This paper is an issues paper that indicates a number of opportunities for further research. Presently a number of case studies within organizations are being conducted to determine how security policy development is taking place, and whether the issues discussed in this paper are evident in practice. The purpose of this research is to design an information system strategic security policy development process. Hopefully organizations will be better protected if they decide to use any outcome of the research in their information security development efforts, as they will be able to judge if their policy is effective.

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