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CPR)

Theme: Organised Crime and Terrorism

Word of Welcome

We are very happy to present to you the second (Spring/Summer) issue of the SGOC newsletter. As it was previously announced the challenging topic of this issue is "Organised crime and terrorism" referring mainly to the links between the two.

Today we live in hyper-dynamic times where obviously inter-state conflicts have been replaced by rising occurrences of intra-state violence; the state as the central focus of international affairs has given way to a host of non-state actors; and, according to many commentators the greatest threat to security emanates from the rapidly evolving phenomena of terrorism and transnational organised crime and moreover their linkage.

The end of the Cold War and succeeding break-up of the Soviet Union ushered in a new international security environment that can no longer be explained by the dominant security paradigms employed previously by most Western governments. As Tamara Makarenko (2002) describes, '...our understanding of security falling under the rubric of high politics, and focused on maintaining the territorial sovereignty of state actors has been questioned by several ongoing international dynamics. In actuality, national, regional and international experience with insecurity over the past decade has confirmed that terrorism and TOC deserve paramount attention precisely because they both span national boundaries, and thus are necessarily multi-dimensional and organised; and, because they directly threaten the stability of states by targeting economic, political and social systems'.

Nevertheless, cautious and systematic evaluation of such statements is often necessary for various reasons. Consider for example that even in the US in the fatal year 2001 the number of people being killed in traffic accidents was still twelve times higher than those killed as result of terrorist attacks.¹ And yet very few fear traffic. Moreover according to data of the State Department, the amount of terrorist incidents in 2002 and 2003 represented an all-time low in international terrorism for the past 32 years. Parallel data from the Rand Corporation corroborates with this downward trend (Coolsaet and Van de Voorde, 2006). Cynics could observe that in the terrorism-OC nexus the two political agendas of the 'War on Terror' and the 'War on Drugs' conveniently converge. Both agendas however are a matter of choice and not an inexorable necessity.

Simultaneously, at the other side of the Atlantic, anxiety seems to be one of the core drivers of current domestic and European politics (Den Boer 2005). Notwithstanding the tragedy of the incidents in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, also here the number of people killed was a fraction of the number of people killed yearly in traffic accidents. Again cynics could observe that links between terrorism and organised crime are a welcome ingredient for governments exploiting the anxiety about terrorism and organised crime in order to prepare the ground for the reclaim of central powers.

¹ According to the U.S. Department of Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in 2001 a total of 37.795 people died as result of motor vehicle accidents (Traffic Safety Facts 2001, p.2)

Finally, should we really be surprised by links between terrorism and organised crime since both can be defined as activities outside the accepted framework of society?

These contrasting thoughts once again emphasize the necessity of a critical approach and empirical grounded research. For this issue of the newsletter we have been able to secure some interesting articles in that perspective.

First Rob McCusker, Research Analyst in Transnational Crime at the Australian Institute of Criminology argues in his article that despite their apparently differing goals the links between organised crime and terrorism are mooted to be increasing in volume. He explains that the relationship is mutually beneficial for both groups. McCusker adds that the key issue for law enforcement agencies is that the traditional separate methods of policing organised crime and terrorism, respectively, are no longer applicable.

Then Panos A Kostakos, PhD Candidate, and Vassilis Kostakos, Post-doctoral Researcher, from Bath University in UK, argue that although the aims of terrorists and organised crime groups might differ, they both use similar methods and means for achieving these aims. According to the authors, both terrorist and criminal actors act rationally, yet achieve different ends, which suggests that profits and political power are their secondary concerns. Their main hypothesis is that the survival and the overall lifecycle of these groups depends on the external and internal criminogenic environment to the group.

In his contribution Wyn Rees, Professor of International Security at the University of Nottingham in UK argues that although attention has been paid to the linkages between criminal and terrorist organisations, insufficient notice has been devoted to the way in which government responses to one phenomenon have overlapped with the other.

John T Picarelli, Research Lecturer and Program Manager at the Center for the Study of Transnational Crime and Corruption in USA, discusses various methodological challenges that researchers studying organised crime and terrorism are facing. He explains that in both cases questions of methodology are often sharp and range from outright disbelief to significant circumspection. Nevertheless, Picarelli argues that while the topic of the links between transnational criminal groups and terror organisations brings this methodological is-

sue to a new arena, it is encouraging to find that the methods terror and crime scholars employ are complimentary.

In his brief contribution Ludo Block, PhD Candidate, questions the validity of the often presented picture that links between terrorism and organised crime are both a recent and increasing phenomenon, which largely occurs in connection to drug trade and international terrorism. Alongside three cases of domestic terrorist groups in France he argues that such links are and have been more common than often presented.

We would like to express our enormous gratitude to the contributors to this issue of the newsletter and we would like to encourage all of you to send us your ideas, comments and remarks in the future. This will help us to produce better quality newsletters that will be valuable for all of us. The theme we selected for the next issue of the newsletter is "emerging criminal markets". You are accordingly invited to submit articles, announcements, conference reports and book reviews related to the topic!

We sincerely hope that you will enjoy reading the articles we prepared for you and we wish you nice summer holidays!

The editors
Jana Arsovska
Ludo Block

Conference Announcements

Crime and Justice Summer Research Institute:
Broadening perspectives and participation
July 10-27, 2006
Criminal Justice Research Center
Ohio State University
cjrc.osu.edu/summerinstitute

6TH Biennial International Criminal Justice Conference
September 21 - 23, 2006
Ljubljana, Slovenia
"Policing in Central and Eastern Europe: Past, Present and Futures"
www.fpvv.uni-mb.si/conf2006/

The Fourth International Conference on Culture, conflict crime. Terrorism and Political Violence
December 10-13, 2006
Nazereth, Israel
www.isas.co.il/conflict2006

Organised Crime and Terrorism: Convergence or Separation?

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The UN Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) identified six key security challenges. Two of these were terrorism and transnational organised crime.

Conceptually, transnational organised crime and terrorism, respectively, have been viewed as distinct and separate entities. The former are perceived to be focussed upon the pursuit of economic gain whilst the latter are deemed to be motivated by ideological and/or political ideals. As Cilluffo (2000) has it '[o]rganized crime's business is business. The less attention brought to their lucrative enterprises, the better. The goal of terrorism is quite the opposite. A wide-ranging public profile is often the desired effect.'

In September 2001, however, the UN Security Council (2001) noted with concern '...the close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, biological and other potentially deadly materials.'


This concern did not come as a surprise to long-term observers of transnational and organised crime and terrorism. There is certainly evidence of strategic alliances between organised crime groups on a truly transnational scale. Equally, there have been suggestions, and some evidence, of convergence between the two entities expressed most often in the context of narco-terrorism. Bovenkerk and Chakra (2004) have suggested that the connections between organised criminals and terrorist networks may take the form of associations, alliances, confluence, convergence or symbiosis. They have argued, however, that there tends to be a repetition of the same examples of this association including references to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), The Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru, guerrilla fighters in Chechnya, the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Bovenkerk and Chakra (2004) note that '...it is striking that most of them fail to provide a thorough empirical analysis of any of these cases and the evidence cited never goes much deeper than a good media account.'

That issue notwithstanding, Ehrenfeld (1990) maintains that the alleged collusion/cooperation between organised crime and terrorism stands up to logical scrutiny. She notes that '[w]hen the two combine, terrorist organisations derive benefits from the drug trade with no loss of status, and drug traffickers who have forged an alliance with terrorists become more formidable and gain in political clout.'

Bovenkerk and Chakra (2004) argue that '[a] number of political and economic developments have brought terrorism and organised crime into each other's territory. There are also a number of clear structural similarities that would appear to make collaboration advantageous for both of them. In addition, both types of organisation can be expected to attract the kind of personality types that reconcile the two types of criminal activities.'

Despite their apparently differing goals the links between organised crime and terrorism are mooted to be increasing in volume. Cilluffo (2000) notes that '[o]rganized crime groups often run the trafficking organizations while the terrorists and insurgent groups often control the territory where the drugs are cultivated and transported. The relationship is mutually beneficial. Both groups use funds garnered from the drug trade to finance their organizations and operations.'

The key issue for law enforcement agencies is that the traditional separative method of policing organised crime and terrorism, respectively, is no longer applicable. Makarenko (2004) has spoken of a 'crime-terror nexus'. This might comprise the use of crime by terrorist groups as a source of funding – such as taxing the drug trade, or engaging in credit-card fraud. Equally, the nexus may also relate to the formation of alliances between criminal and terrorist organisations. Aside from these two common types of relationship, however, Makarenko suggests that a new more complex relationship has evolved. She suggests that the impact of globalisation in terms of technology, communication, population movement, weak and failing states and states in transition, '...the distinction between political and criminal motivated violence is often blurred. In many respects, the rise of transnational organised crime in the 1990s, and the changing phenomena that have begun to reveal many operational and organisational similarities. Security, as a result, should now be viewed as a cauldron of traditional and emerging threats that interact with one another, and at times, converge. It is in this context that the crime-terror continuum exists.'



On this scale, organised crime sits on the left hand side and terrorism on the right. At the fulcrum lies the point of convergence in which an organisation or network may be regarded as exhibiting both criminal and terrorist characteristics.

Within this continuum, Makarenko discerns four broad general groups: (1) alliances, (2) operational motivations, (3) convergence and (4) and the “black hole.”

Alliances

This is deemed to be the first level of relationship that exists between organised crime and terrorism. Thus, criminal groups form alliances with terrorist organisations, and terrorist groups seek alliances with criminal organisations. The nature of alliances between groups can vary, ranging from one-off, short-term and long-term relationships. Furthermore, alliances can be established for a range of reasons from the requirement for expert knowledge (e.g. money-laundering, counterfeiting, or bomb-making) or operational support (e.g. access to smuggling routes). Shelley (2003) argues in relation to the importance of such relationships that “cooperation with terrorists may have significant benefits for organised criminals by destabilising the political structure, undermining law enforcement and limiting the possibilities for international cooperation.”

Operational Motivations

Makarenko suggests that the only reason for collaboration to exist between organised crime groups and terrorist networks is to secure organisational operations. This fact has necessitated the avoidance of problems inherent in all alliances including disagreement over strategy and fears of distrust. Thus, [c]riminal groups using terrorism as an operational tool, and terrorist groups taking part in criminal activities as an operational tool, constitute the second component of the crime-terror continuum.’

Convergence

Makarenko suggests that it is possible for criminal and terrorist organisations to converge into a single entity that displays characteristics of both groups simultaneously and thereafter may transform itself into the other type of organisation. As Makarenko puts it, “ ... the ultimate aims and motivations of the organisation have actually changed. In these cases, the groups no longer retain the defining points that had hitherto made them a political or criminal group”

This convergence thesis involves two components. First, it includes criminal groups which display political motivations. Secondly, it includes terrorist groups who are equally interested in making a profit and begin to use their terrorist identity as a justification for unrelated criminal activity.

“Black Hole” Thesis

This thesis refers to the situation in which weak or failed states facilitate the convergence between transnational organised crime and terrorism, and ultimately create a safe haven for the continued operations of such entities.

It is clear that transnational organised crime groups have been in a state of constant evolution. Once structured upon strict hierarchical lines modern groups are in fact loosely affiliated networks based on a cell-like structure. These networks are increasingly multi-ethnic, multi-jurisdictional and willing to form strategic alliances in pursuit of a common profit goal. These networks have, in many jurisdictions, achieved via systematic and sustained corruption, a high degree of symbiosis with law enforcement and government agencies. They remain both reactive and proactive. Equally, terrorist groups have become incredibly adept at pursuing their collective goals utilising what Stratfor (2005a; 2005b; 2005c; 2005d; 2005e and 2005f) have identified as a six-stage attack cycle, even if their methods remain relatively unsophisticated.

As Jacoby (2004) noted in testimony provided to a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 2004 'Al-Qaida remains the greatest terrorist threat to our homeland...Despite 25 months of sustained pressure, al-Qaida continues to demonstrate it is an adaptable and capable threat'. This view was supported by the Director of the FBI (Mueller 2004) when he maintained that "[t]he greatest threat remains international terrorism – specifically Sunni extremists, including al-Qaida...Al-Qaida's flexibility and adaptability continue to make them dangerous and unpredictable." That both organised crime and terrorist groups continue to adapt should come as little surprise. That both constitute a present and ongoing threat to the security (including human security) of states is in little doubt. What is needed, therefore, (and discussed by the author in other fora) is analysis of how that actual threat might be mitigated.

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BOOK REVIEWERS NEEDED FOR GLOBAL CRIME!

Please find below a list of recently published books (or forthcoming books). If you are interested in reviewing any of them for Global Crime please email me at alum@waitrose.com and I will organise to get the book to you. If there are other books which you feel we should also review please also contact me.

Organised Crime - Alan Wright Jan 2006 Willam Publishing

Sex Traffic Prostitution, Crime and Exploitation - Paola Monzini November 2005 Zed Book

Russian Organised Crime: Warning from the East - Patricia Rawlinson 20 June 2006 Pluto Pr

Measuring Corruption (Law, Ethics and Governance Series) – Editors Charles Sampford, Arthur Shacklock and Carmel Connors, Ashgate, 2006

Is the Mafia Still a Force in America? - David H Haugen March 2006 Greenhaven Press

We Are Fighting the World: A History of the Marashea Gangs in South Africa, 1947 - 1999 - Gary Kynoch Jan 2005 Ohio Uni Press

African Underclass, Urbanisation, Crime and Colonial Order in Dar Es Salaam, 1919 - 61 - Andrew Burton Oct 2005 James Currey Publishers

Colored Amazons: Crime, Violence, and Black Women in the City of Brotherly Love 1880 - 1910 - Kali N Gross 15 August 2006 Duke Uni Press

Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region - United Nations Pubns April 2005

Crime, Punishment, and Policing in China - Borge Bakken March 28 2006 Rowman and Littlefield Publishers

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Criminal group behaviour and operational environments

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Organised crime (OC) and terrorism are two essentially contested concepts. There is no universally accepted definition that can be applied to describe these phenomena. The lack of a single definition makes the task of bordering the nexus between OC and terrorism challenging. The mainstream argument on the aims, organisation and *modus operandi* of these types of criminal organisations is that terrorists aim to accumulate political power whilst organised crime groups aim primarily for economic gains and profits. Additionally, it is generally accepted that both terrorist and OC use similar methods and means for achieving these ends. In the post 9/11 period many people have raised their concerns that the OC/terrorism nexus poses a serious threat. A number of publications have responded to these concerns by analysing the similarities between organised crime and terrorism.

Sanderson (2004) express the view that both phenomena operate in a common ground outside the sphere of law. Based on this assertion, he offers a list of commonalities between terrorism and organised crime. Some of the points in that list are that both use extreme violence, threats of reprisals, kidnappings, assassinations and extortion; they operate secretly and defy the state and the rule of law; members rarely leave the groups and they use interchangeable recruitment pools (Sanderson 2004: 53). However, in our view a significant similarity is that both terrorist and organised crime groups are formed by *rational actors* (Ibid.). This assertion forces us to recalculate the way we analyse and perceive the lifecycle of such organisations.

The assumption that both terrorist and criminal actors act rationally, yet achieve different ends, suggests that profits and political power are their secondary concerns. The fundamental aim of any organisation formed by rational actors is to continue their existence. The principle of "survival" is informed by a Realist philosophy and extends to all

types of organisations including formal states, legal businesses and large corporations. The analytical significance of this statement should be considered in parallel with the view that the survival of any type of group/organisation depends on a relation between its external and internal environments.

Pettinger notes that "as no organisation exists in isolation from its environment, the nature and extent of the relationship and interaction must be considered" (2000: 21). In the case of criminal organisations our hypothesis is that the survival and the overall lifecycle of these groups depends on the external and internal criminogenic environment to the group. In the criminological context, the concept "external criminogenic environment" is a reference to the reality that surrounds the external realm of criminal and terrorist organisations. This reality is not the main cause of OC or terrorism per se, but the condition or environment that facilitates or prevents these activities. Some commentators, for instance, offer a categorisation based on various economic, political and cultural models and conditions that facilitate OC (Williams and Godson 2002). On the other hand the concept "internal criminogenic environment" is a reference to the endogenous dynamics, structure, organisation and *modus operandi* of the criminal and terrorist organisation. The later environment we believe to be the root causes of the phenomena under our investigation.

Criminal and terrorist organisations are well aware of the dangers posed by their external realm and of the importance in maintaining a balance with their internal environment. We deduct this assumption from criminals' "pre-emptive strikes" against external changes. Corruption, for instance, is a main strategic tool used by organised groups in an attempt to control the external environment rather than be forced to change their internal structures and *modus operandi*. Terrorist and guerrilla groups, on the other hand, use tactics that aim to influence the public opinion and support for their cause.

The lifecycle of criminal and terrorist organisations is based on a fragile balance between their external and internal criminogenic environments. We derive an analytic framework by considering the organisational and environmental variables and the relations between them. Empirical evidence suggests that in instances where the external environment changes, the internal environment of the group adjusts in order to remain fit and survive. Failure to adjust or pursue corrective action results in the group's decline or death.

Globalisation, rapid communication and transportation and information access are external forces that affect the aforementioned criminogenic balance of OC and terrorist groups. Technological innovation is a force, external to the group that effects the operation and structuring of organisations. Adaptation to these changes is vital for the continuation and growth of any well established criminal or terrorist group. Sanders notes that these forces are also factors that “lead terrorist groups to embrace organised crime as a source of revenue” (2004: 50). New and emerging technologies are an aspect of both the external and internal environments of states, OC and terrorist groups. Technologies are being employed by governments in order to monitor and collect evidence in relation to illegal and terrorist activities. Traces left by email messages, Internet browsing, as well as CCTV footage are such examples. Additionally, technologies are being used by governments to actively track and spy on organised groups and terrorists, with mobile phone technology being the prime example.

However, new and emerging technologies (Kostakos et al., 2005) are increasingly being utilised by criminals and terrorists’ internal environments in order to achieve a balance with their external environments. Communication technologies, such as email and instant messaging, allow organisations to decentralise a group’s structure, and allow for coordination of activities across physical locations. Cryptographic advances have made it virtually impossible, in the absence of inside information, to decipher messages exchanged by criminals. Furthermore, identity theft is becoming increasingly feasible, mostly by means of digital infiltration of email and bank accounts. Emerging technologies such as Radio-Frequency Identification Tags (e.g. the London transport pass), as well as the use biometrics for identification and authentication, offer criminals and terrorists opportunities for data and identity theft. Indicatively, we note that biometrics are always approximate, always susceptible to spoofing, and cannot be revoked. These features of biometrics offer criminals unique opportunities for identity theft and further abuse.

The appropriation of new and emerging technologies and innovations by criminal groups allows these groups to balance with the external environment and maintain their existence. Although criminal groups use new technology as a tool for committing crime, they also make use of this tool to balance their *modus operandi* with reality.

By applying the principle of criminogenic balancing across instances we can derive to some helpful conclusions regarding the behaviour and responses of OC and terror groups. The aforementioned examples illustrate the nexus points between the phenomena of our investigation and our framework provides the means for analysing these examples. Due to space restrictions we were not able to expand our analysis to further examples. It is interesting to test the balancing theory in a comparative setting across diverse instances. Such testing can apply to case studies were OC responds to external changes and terrorist groups do not, and visa versa; or in cases were the hypothesis is falsified. This exercise could enlighten us on the nature of the similarities and differences that exist in the behaviour of OC and terrorism respectively.

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SGOC's Executive Committee up for Renewal...

The ECPR Standing Group on Organised crime was established in 2001 and its executive committee has served its five years in office and is now up for renewal. The main tasks of the executive committee are to organise ECPR events, encourage ideas for projects, supplement the website and generally keep the group active and focused on the latest developments in the study of organised crime. As the group is still very much in its infancy, the executive committee would like to carry on its work for another five years if members do not object. However, it would welcome any members who would like to join the executive in its activities, especially the organisation of a section at the ECPR's 4th General Conference in Pisa in September 2007. If you would like to become more involved, please email Felia Allum (mlsfsa@bath.ac.uk) or Fabio Armao (fabio.armao@unito.it).

Linking Organised Crime and Terrorism

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This article seeks to explore some of the linkages between organised crime and terrorism. It argues that although attention has been paid to the linkages between criminal and terrorist organisations, insufficient notice has been devoted to the way in which government responses to one phenomenon have overlapped with the other.

Commenting upon the linkages between organised crime and terrorism is not particularly new: many analysts have drawn attention to points of contact between these various forms of illegal activity. (Schmid, 1996 and Politi, 1997: 11) At the simplest level there are a plethora of examples where criminal gangs have employed terrorist tactics to further their own objectives. For example, car bombings and kidnappings were used by the Sicilian Mafia to destabilise Italian society, whilst their counterparts in Russia resorted to similar sorts of activities. In turn, organisations committed to a political struggle can develop splinter groups that use crime for selfish profit – witness the activities of some republican and protestant paramilitaries in Northern Ireland before and after the Good Friday Agreement.

A second form of linkage exists in terms of shared interests leading to cooperation. Criminal gangs, with their access to networks and local contacts, can offer a range of illicit services to terrorist groups, ranging from the transiting of sensitive materials to the procuring of weapons. In some parts of the world, terrorist organisations are known to profit directly from conducting, or at least sheltering, drug trafficking activity. Many militant groups lost their sponsors at the end of the Cold War and had to find alternative sources of funding. Such organisations as the 'Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia' (FARC), the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and the Sendero Luminosa (Shining Path) in Peru, use their control of territory to protect narcotics trafficking and draw upon this as a source of revenue. (Rabasa & Chalk, 2001) In Afghanistan, the Taliban, with links to opium production, were openly providing sanctuary to Al-Qaeda.

A third form of linkage is to that of 'failed states'. Both organised crime and terrorism are believed to flourish in the same environments where there is disorder and an absence of governmental control.

Such societies are characterised by high levels of violence, corruption and the potential subversion of state structures to illicit activity. Criminal and terrorist groups can both reside on these territories and use them as safe locations from which to conduct their activities. Examples of such territories abound and are frequently post-conflict societies: Bosnia and Albania post-1996 and Kosovo after 1999.

The linkages between terrorist groups and criminal gangs have been the subject of considerable attention and interest. What has been less remarked upon is the way in which governmental efforts to combat these two phenomena have become mutually reinforcing. Governments, particularly within the West, have come to see organised crime and terrorism as justifying an inter-related series of countermeasures.

Since the end of the Cold War, international organised crime and transnational terrorism have been seen as part of a spectrum of new, non-military threats. They are new in the sense that they cross the former divide between internal and external security. Because they conduct their activities across state boundaries, international crime and terrorism can only be combated effectively if states work together and deploy the full range of instruments available to them. The United States has been effective in this regard, both because it has an array of coercive instruments at its disposal, including military forces with a global reach, and because it has long experience of mobilising resources against such threats. The US 'War on Drugs' and 'War on Crime', for example, serve as precedents for the current 'War on Terrorism'. The European Union has experienced more difficulty in operationalising its responses because these security challenges have cut across its organisational competences: counter-terrorism straddles the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Justice and Home Affairs portfolio, but can also involve economic issues within the original sphere of the European Community.

Two of the instruments for addressing organised crime and terrorism are the use of police forces and judicial agencies. Cooperation between police forces across national jurisdictions, the extradition of suspects and international prosecutions are vital tools in combating these threats. Much of the European effort to counter transnational terrorism since September 11, 2001 (9/11) has drawn on efforts that were previously conceived to deal with crime. For example, the European Police Agency (Europol) was originally designed to fight against crime and drug trafficking and was only given a responsibility for terrorism as late as 1999. (Mit-

silegas, Monar & Rees, 2003:25) The European Arrest Warrant was lauded after 9/11 as the EU's response to speeding up the extradition of terrorist suspects but it owed its rapid entry into operation to the fact that it had designed earlier to counter crime. Similarly, in the case of the Bush administration, its response to 9/11 was to rush through the PATRIOT Act. This Act created new federal crimes relating to terrorist attack; it toughened federal money laundering laws; increased powers to prevent entry into the US; permitted the confidential use of informants, surveillance and search warrants and the imposition of plea-bargaining. Yet most of these measures had been prepared prior to 9/11 to combat organised crime.

Another instrument, intelligence information, is also relevant in the fight against both organised crime and terrorism. The sharing of information on both sources of threats enables governments to penetrate these clandestine groups and prevent crimes from being perpetrated. The US has taken the dramatic step of ending the separation between information obtained by the law enforcement and intelligence communities. In July 2003 the Federal Bureau of Investigation ended the separation that had existed between investigations into suspected terrorist activity that relied on intelligence gained under the US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), and material gained through law enforcement techniques. This brings its own problems of trying to draw together distinct cultures between intelligence and law enforcement agencies, requiring that they work together, communicate effectively and share information. Nevertheless, this decision illustrated two overlapping trends: law enforcement has become increasingly concerned with foreign policy issues, whilst intelligence services have become more involved in gathering information on individuals that break the law. (Best, 2001:2)

The implications of these developments are important. On the one hand, for governments to appreciate the potential linkages between criminal organisations and terrorist groups offers them a better understanding of the threats they may face. On the other hand, observers of state policy need to be aware that governments will use counter measures designed for one problem and apply them to another area. This process carries risks of its own. Policies designed to tackle one issue may be introduced and justified according to quite unrelated criteria. For example, there may be a significant impact upon civil liberties if new criminal measures are brought into effect on the grounds of fighting terrorism. It is likely to be more difficult to maintain accountability over security policies if a mutually

self-sustaining discourse of domestic and international threats becomes deeply entrenched. Thus it will be important for analysts to keep state policies towards both organised crime and terrorism under close scrutiny.

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Presenting a Paper?

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The Methodological Challenges to Studying Crime and Terror Links

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Scholars of crime and terror attempt to bring to light those things that prefer the shadows and reveal facts about those things wrapped in myths and legends. Such scholars often receive very pointed questions concerning method and “how do you know what you know” when presenting or publishing their work. Questions of methodology are often sharp, pointed and range from outright disbelief to significant circumspection. While the topic of the links between transnational criminal groups and terror organizations brings this methodological issue to a new arena, it is encouraging to find that the methods terror and crime scholars employ are complimentary.

Cressey (1967) was one of the first to tackle the methodological issue directly, publishing a methodological work drawn from his famous study of organized crime in the US. Cressey employed an interesting analogy for his method of studying organized crime—the archeological process. He posited that if one begins with the knowledge that organized crime (and by extension terror) groups exist, then the first step of the researcher is to examine documentary sources and develop a hypothetical framework that will guide the investigator’s analysis. As Indiana Jones said, archeology is more about digging in the library than in the dirt to find knowledge. For Cressey, completing this “digging” gives the researcher a higher probability of placing newly discovered “artifacts” (e.g. a case file or a jailhouse interview) into a context that provides more information than the artifact alone could provide. For example, just as the discovery of a bowl at a certain depth and location can provide information to the investigator concerning the date of an encampment and who established it, so too can a healthy amount of research provide a context through which to assess new developments.

In order to press ahead from this most basic understanding of methodology, we scholars of the dark arts must pay heed to three methodological issues. Models are first and foremost as they provide the platform from which we can infer a level of certainty for our assertions. Evidence is a second issue, both in terms of data collections and of potential biases. Last, and of specific importance to

the topic of crime-terror interaction, is the issue of ontology—making clear we are comparing like to like.

In terms of models, one can categorize the approaches to organized crime into loose categories that find ready parallel in the terrorism sphere. The rationalist camp, the most prominent group, is home to the largest collection of models including Cressey’s (1969) hierarchical bureaucratic model and the private protection model of Gambetta (1993) and Varese (2001). Other rationalists include Smith’s (1980) and Block’s (1980) model of crime groups as agents operating in larger illicit contexts subject to market forces and microeconomic principals, and of course there is Albin’s (1971) patron-client model.

A different tack is taken in Ianni and Reuss-Ianni’s (1972) social network model of organized crime, which emphasizes the sociocultural aspects of groups. Challengers to this rationalist camp critique their causal models, focusing on truncated variables and an inability to produce generalizable statements. Paoli (2003) argues that the structure and behavior of the families of the ‘Ndrangheta and the Sicilian Mafia do not fit most causal models of organized crime. Mastrofski and Potter (1986) likewise note that organized criminal activity is often more informal, loosely structured and flexible than the explanations derived from causal models. In summarizing these limitations, one needs only to turn to Von Lampe (2003) who, after critiquing causal models as a methodological approach altogether, advocates a more heuristic framework that provides a systematic typology of criminal behavior that serves as a foundation from which to generate hypotheses. While some camps are more prominent in different fields of social inquiry, the debate concerning models and associated methods is a healthy one as it advances our aggregate understanding of how to approach the linkages between crime and terror.

Turning then to evidence, we can here focus on terrorism scholars as their strategies for bias-free evidence collection are likewise readily applicable to organized crime studies. Terror scholars have utilized a wide array of quantitative and qualitative techniques to obtain data, demonstrating that no one strategy is perfect. In 1988, Schmid and Jongman expertly captured this discussion through a detailed survey of data sources that contained utility for terrorism research. The authors pointed to studies utilizing structured data sets, case studies, surveys, interviews and other evidence collection strategies, thereby demonstrating a spread across the qualitative and quantitative divide. Im-

proving on this survey is Silke's (2004) edited volume, which sponsored works that discuss successful data collection in terrorism studies as well as tackling the method for avoiding bias. Silke's chapter in the volume speaks directly to these tandem issues. Noting that open source documents remain the primary source of data for terror scholars, Silke warns us to beware the ever-prominent pitfall of relying on sources with inaccurate and/or biased reporting. In sum, terror studies reinforce the widely-held opinion that no one evidence collection strategy is perfect and introduces the potential benefits from utilizing two or more sources of evidence when tackling the crime-terror nexus.

The ontological issue is likely the most problematic. The root of the problem is the well-documented failure of scholars and practitioners alike to arrive at an accepted definition of terrorism and organized crime. Given that some have even questioned if these debates are necessary, let us focus here on a more practical issue related to researching the links between crime and terror. Frequently, one will find government reports, media stories and even papers that link an crime or terror *organization* with to the *behavior* of the other and deem that a nexus. However, just because a terror group engages in a criminal enterprise like document fraud or smuggling does not make a nexus.

Put plainly, when writing of the links between crime and terror, we need to make clear what constitutes a link. For example, Makarenko (2003) has an eloquent and well-supported categorization of how crime and terror groups collaborate, laying plain the different stages of collaboration and providing the all-important mechanism of evolution in crime-terror relations. Williams and Picarelli (2002) contribute to this by engaging organized crime and terrorism as both actors and activities, allowing for the discussion of an actor engaging in the other's activity. Combining these notions with Shelley's (1999) notion of a typology of criminal actors, Shelley and Picarelli et al. (2005) provide a typology that considers how actors, activities and environments combine to determine the nature of crime-terror interaction.

I would submit that these methodological issues have by and large driven the research on the nexus of transnational crime and terrorism into one of two levels of analysis. Some choose to focus on the agents that participate in a nexus between transnational organized crime and international terrorism. Most all of the studies mentioned in the prior paragraph would fall into this category. Williams (1998) conducted one of the more detailed analyses at this level, using three cooperative

models of criminal and terrorist groups and concluding that short term convergent and divergent episodes between the two were more likely than a longer-term nexus or cooperative relationship. Shelley and Picarelli (2002) built upon this conclusion in a comparative study that showed how transnational organized crime and terrorism have cooperated in the past despite conflicting motives (e.g. organized crime as economically focused and terrorism as politically driven) that prevent more lasting cooperative measures, concluding that a more sustained and systematic research effort could inform US policymakers and practitioners.

Others have preferred to make the connection between the two at a more structural level. Rosenau (1990), Galleotti (2001), Cusimano-Love (2003), and Castells (2000) have compared transnational crime and terrorism as malevolent non-state actors that exploit failures in the state-centric global system, such as the limitations of sovereignty, legal jurisdictional boundaries and the opportunities that failed or weak states create for safe havens. Sassen (1998), Mittelman (2000) and Naim (2003) support this theme, but focus more on how globalization has empowered both organized crime and terrorism—making them the dark side of globalization. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) have likewise noted that both transnational criminal and terrorist organizations have adopted network structures to expand organizational reach, to improve information collection, and to reduce operational risks.

Methodology is therefore not something that stands in the way of completing solid research on crime or terror. Criminology, sociology, political science, international affairs, economics, anthropology and other social science disciplines have each come to the table with their preferred methods and left a rich, heterogeneous milieu within which to initiate studies. The more that we are open about method and willing to engage it, the better we can serve the ultimate consumers of our craft—our students and those trying to bring an end to crime and terror worldwide.

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Terrorism-OC links: A Contemporary Issue?

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Some argue that terrorism and organised crime directly threaten the stability of states by targeting economic, political and social systems and that especially the links between these deserve paramount attention (Makarenko 2002). These links have received considerable attention lately and are often depicted as a new and increasing phenomenon that is caused by the rapid developments in the past decade. This results in a situation where political and criminal motivated violence is often blurred (Makarenko 2004).

Various models of linkage have been presented varying from a simple taxonomy to the construction of a continuum (e.g. Bovenkerk and Chakra 2004, Makarenko 2004, Schmidt 1996). Often international terrorism and drug trade are mentioned as examples where terrorists and organised criminals collaborate strongly. Also in the public discourse the issue has gained attention and recently the involvement members of an 'Al-Quaida-linked group in armed robberies in France prompted the French press to label the phenomenon '*le gangsterrorisme*'.

However how 'new' are the links between terrorism and organised crime? A century ago the Bolsheviks - most notably Josef Stalin - already were involved in armed robberies to bankroll their 'revolution' and there are many other examples of terrorists and criminals using overlapping or similar methods and also cooperate where mutual beneficial.

This article briefly examines the activities of three domestic terrorist groups two of which are and one that has been active in France. France has a rich history of terrorism and historic references to the term "terrorism" first appeared during the Reign of Terror (1793-1794) period in France. Moreover in the last three decades terrorist groups of various backgrounds have been present on French soil.

The aim of this article is mainly to illustrate the difficulty in many cases to distinguish between terrorism and organised crime. The examples all pre-date the hype of the last few years with regard to this phenomenon. The groups of which the activities will be reviewed are the ultra-left *Action Directe (AD)*, the nationalist Corsican movement mostly

represented as the *Front de libération nationale de la Corse* and the Basque separatist *Euskadi 'ta Askatasuna* (ETA) as regards its activities on French soil.

Action Directe (AD) was an ultra-left terrorist group in France that has been active between 1979 and 1987. In the beginning AD was - as a movement - the result of a fusion between several left-wing action groups in the late 1970s seeing themselves as an urban-guerrilla and using the name AD as umbrella. After an amnesty in 1981 by the French government most activists renounced violence while only a minority continued with terrorist attacks. In 1982 AD fall apart in a branch motivated by international issues - e.g. French foreign politics - and a branch oriented on national issues. All together seventy-three terrorist attacks between 1979 and 1986 are attributed to AD and include machine-gun attacks, bombings and fourteen murders.

The main source of income for the small core of members seems to have been dozens of bank robberies. Especially the activities of the national branch - that robbed over 30 banks alone - resembled ordinary banditry more than ideological inspired terrorism. While its terrorist actions were often symbolic more extreme violence was used during the bank robberies. During his trial a prominent member, Maxime Frérot, was described as a '*grand professionnel du vol à main armée*' (Dartnell 1995: 176-177).

The second group that we will briefly examine is the *Front de libération nationale de la Corse* (FLNC). Although separatist nationalists already were active early 20th century on the French Mediterranean isle Corsica a firm radicalisation occurred in the 1960s with various bomb attacks carried out by the separatist movement from 1965 onwards as result. Since 1976 the nationalistic movement is organised in the political-military FLNC.

The FLNC strives by various means - including terrorist attacks - for autonomy of Corsica. The movement has seen various separations and regroupings however in general the name FNLC is used to indicate all these groups. One exception is the *Armata Corsa* (or 'Corsican Army') that separated in 1999 from the FLNC and claims to act against the link between the nationalists and the criminal scene in Corsica. *Armata Corsa* denounces the mafia-style activities of some nationalist groups on the island however one of its supposed leaders, François Santoni, in 2001 received

a 4 year imprisonment sentence for past activities of extortion.

The links between the Corsican nationalist movement and organised crime have been widely documented since the 1970s and French journalists writing on the links between the FNLC and organised crime have been victim of attacks. Members of the FNLC have been convicted for armed robberies, drug trafficking, counterfeiting and extortion. Only the latter - euphemistically called 'revolutionary tax' with non-payment usually followed by assassination - seems to have a direct connection with the aims of the FNLC.

In most other cases and especially with regard to the armed robberies it has not been possible to distinguish between those committed '*pour la "cause" et ceux réalisés à titre "privé"*' (Gayraud 1990: 8). The entanglement of 'terrorism' and 'crime' on Corsica is intense and seems to have led to a vicious circle: criminal activities finance the separatist movement while the terrorist threat coming from that movement impedes the rule of law and creating a climate in which organised crime can thrive.

The Basque separatist movement ETA in Spain was created in 1959 based on ideas spread by its predecessor 'Ekin' (Action) that was erected in 1953. In 1962 the ETA declared that 'violence was a necessity' for its cause however only after 1966 bombings and other terrorist attacks became structural.

A part of the historical claimed Basque country is located in France and some 260.000 Basques live in France so the repressive reaction of the Spanish authorities on the ETA soon resulted in many *Ettaras* (members of the ETA) taking refuge in France. For decades France has been the preparation and training ground for the ETA and from the current estimated 250 ETA operatives at large 100 to 200 are believed to hide in France.

Many preparatory crimes for terrorist attacks are committed in France by them, especially the theft of explosives and ingredients for explosives and arms and explosives caches are also maintained on French soil. Moreover the preparation of the extortion including the actual collection of 'revolutionary tax' from entrepreneurs in Northern Spain often takes place in France. While such activities more or less have a direct link with the ideological motives of the ETA many other crimes with a much more remote link to the original motives are committed as well. The young 'soldiers' of the ETA that are in hiding and receive their training on French

soil usually start with stealing cars and do this in large numbers. To cover their cost of living above the meagre 'salary' they receive from the ETA they also engage in armed robberies and other crimes.

These briefly examined cases show that the reliance of terrorists on criminal activity and links with organised crime is nothing new and occurred already in France in the 1970s and 1980s. It became also clear that links between terrorism and organized crime occurs in different types of domestic terrorist groups and it is difficult to distinguish whether some actions should be labelled as terrorism or organised crime. In all three cases furthermore strong indications can be found that the criminal activity by these terrorists not necessarily is or was instrumental to their political cause.

With regard to the FNLC there is ample evidence that it is deeply involved in 'ordinary' organised crime and the bank robberies by members of *Action Directe* raise similar suspicion. Arguably the criminal activity by young *Ettaras* in France to sustain a living during their hiding for the Spanish justice and preparation for new operations could be regarded as instrumental to the aim of ETA.

The conclusion that the line between political and criminal violence is often blurred is therefore nothing new. In that perspective it is helpful to realise that the line between terrorism and organised crime is just a legal construct. It would be naïve to expect terrorists and criminals to stay within conceptual boundaries that were constructed independently of their reality.

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CONTRIBUTIONS

For both the blog and the newsletter we are looking for:

- Book reviews of approximately 500-900 words, original books in language of your choice but reviews should be written in English. Indicate the language of the book.
- Conference reports of about 1000 words in English. Share your experience at conferences with those who are unable to attend them;
- Information on Calls for Papers, coming conferences and any other interesting material for our readers.

For the newsletter we are looking for short original articles (1000-2000 words) on the themes of the newsletters. You are also invited to propose a theme. **The theme selected for the September issue is "Emerging criminal markets". The deadline for that issue is 1 September 2006.**

Please send your (ideas for) contributions to: oceditor@lycos.co.uk

Disclaimer: While every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of information contained in this newsletter, neither the Editors nor the ECPR can accept responsibility for any errors.